
A new problem for rule following

Mark Hogarth Cambridge





Non-Turing computers are the new non-Euclidean geometries 'It is absolutely impossible that anybody who understands the question and knows Turing's definition should decide for a different concept'

Hao Wang

Experiment escorts us last — His pungent company Will not allow an Axiom An Opportunity

EMILY DICKINSON



The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. Re-evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections - the logical laws being in turn simply certain further statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. Having reevaluated one statement we must re-evaluate some others, whether they be statements logically connected with the first or whether they be the statements of logical connections themselves. But the total field is so undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.

Quine 1951 'Two dogmas of empiricism'

- Our theories capture the world
- Undetermined
- *Nothing* is immune from revision
- Fundamental revisions are rare

paradigm (a theory) new 'evidence' opposition tension revolution new paradigm (a new theory) Concept of Geometry

Euclidean Geometry

Lobachevskian, Reimannian Geometry

Tension

Pure geometry

. . .

Euclidean Geometry Lobachevskian Reimannian Schwarzschild **Physical Geometry**

General relativity, etc.

Tension (roughly late 18^{the} century-1915)

'I fear the uproar of the Boeotians' (Gauss)

Kant (EG is true a priori)

EG is 'natural', 'perfect', 'intuitive', 'intuitive', 'ideal'

Poincaré: EG is conventionally true

Russell (1897): non-Euclidean geometeries with constant curvature are permissible

Computers

New evidence is coming to light...

philosophy/logic

(infinite, paradoxes, firstorder logic M-H decidable, determinism)

supertasks

(Version of Thomspon's Lamp, super-computations)

mathematics


(non-globally hyperbolic, not forever spatially closed)


M-H worlds

physics (blue-shifts, cosmic censorship hypothesis)

computability

(new TM-based computers, new concept of Computability)





Concept of Computability

The Turing machine

Various new computers (mould, SADs)

tension

Pure computability Physical computability

OTM, SAD₁, ...

theories

that house these computers

Assess the physical

Concept of Geometry

Euclidean Geometry

Lobachevskian, Reimannian Geometry

Tension

Pure geometry

. . .

Euclidean Geometry Lobachevskian Reimannian Schwarzschild **Physical Geometry**

General relativity, etc.

Typical geometrical question:

Do the angles of a triangle sum to 180?

Pure: Yes in Euclidean geometry, No in Lobachevskian, No in Reimannian, etc.

Physical: Actually No

Typical computability question:

Is the halting problem decidable?

Pure: No by OTM, Yes by SAD₁, etc.

Physical: problem connected with as yet unsolved cosmic censorship hypothesis (Nemeti's group).

Question: Is the SAD₁ 'less real' than the OTM?

Answer: Is Lobachevskian geometry 'less real' than Euclidean geometry? *Pure* models do not compete, e.g. no infinite vs. finite

The 'true geometry' is Euclidean geometry ('Euclid's thesis')

For: 'pure', natural, intuitive, different yet equivalent axiomatizations.

Against: Reimannian geometry etc.

Neither is right (pseudo statement)

The 'Ideal Computer' is a Turing machine (CT thesis)

For: 'pure', natural, intuitive, different yet equivalent axiomatizations.

Against: SAD₁ machine etc.

Neither is right (this is no ideal computer, just as there is no ture geometry)

What is a computer?

What is a geometry?

